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Abstract: With the smart grid development, advancements in deeply integrated information and communication technology
(ICT) provide enhanced system awareness, effective decision-making support and high-performance protection and control
(P&C) to improve operational reliably and stability of the modern power systems. To manage the risks relevant to the existing
industrial P&C systems, it is of high necessity to develop a methodology of cyber security testing for industrial P&C systems.
This methodology will be rolled out to continue to evaluate the risks for the next-generation industrial P&C systems when new
ICTs are introduced e.g. IEC 61850. This study summarises the main purpose, scope of work of an innovation project in
collaboration with National Grid. This on-going project is to develop such a methodology using the state-of-art real-time digital
simulation to conduct hardware-in-the-loop testing.
1 Introduction
In recent years, research on cyber security for smart grids has
shown that intentional attack could bring significant impact to
power system reliability and stability. As a result, it could lead to
further damage to the benefits of a utility and its stakeholders, e.g.
damage to the reputation of a utility and economic loss to its
customers. In [1], the authors investigated the impact of
coordinated cyber-attacks on state estimation. Conditions to
reproduce stealthy attacks targeting robust state estimators are
determined whilst the phasor measurement unit assisted solutions
to diagnose the attack are discussed. Attackers who have direct
access to the back end system or field equipment may even modify
the grid configuration for wider area physical impact on grid
operations, which could result in a further economic loss to the
market [2, 3]. Similarly, denial of service attacks could be raised in
the absence of any component in the communication network,
which leads to significant delays or impairs legitimate services [4,
5]. From protection and control (P&C) point of view, it is also
important to verify the integrity of device configuration, algorithms
and application before deployment and preferably throughout the
operation [6]. For example, tampered relays can lead to mal-
operation of the corresponding circuit breakers, which can cause
cascading wider area system failures.
The risks introduced by vulnerabilities in information and
communication technology and P&C should be carefully managed.
To provide effective management, it is critical to understand the
complexity of cyber physical systems with respect to a number of
key areas that include:
• the physical and logical architecture of the system
• the actual services and vulnerabilities presented by each device
• the potential impacts of a series of cyber events engineered to
exploit the vulnerabilities that have been proved to exist
Without a proper understanding of the system and methodology
for management of those risks, there is significant potential to lead
to a series of power system incidents and even severe system
blackouts, which inevitably bring certain or even significant losses
to a transmission owner and its stakeholders. In this case, in order
to help understand the complex relation between cyber and
physical equipment, a fit for purpose cyber physical testbed should
be developed for simulating the power system together with
physical hardware connected and operated in real time. This study
summarises the on-going work of developing such a methodology
using the state-of-the-art real-time digital simulation (RTDS) to
conduct hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing with the following
technical considerations:
• Design and implementation of the RTDS-based HIL testbed
which is fit for the purpose.
• Determination of vulnerabilities that exist within a system.
• Design of test scenarios to conduct cyber events and evaluation
of their impacts on the reliability, security and safety of network
operation for conventional P&C systems as well as IEC-61850
based P&C systems.
2 Implementation of the RTDS-based HIL testbed
RTDS has been used for performing HIL experiments in a wide
range of applications [7, 8]. Through different interfaces, the RTDS
can be used to interact with different types of physical equipment
in different ways. Two main types of RTDS-based HIL testbeds are
introduced. To help understand the system, a model of standard
Kundur's two-area four-machine system is implemented in RTDS
that includes the high-voltage components, e.g. synchronous
generators, transmission lines, circuit breakers, instrumental
transformers, power transformers, static load, and plus differential
P&C functions.
2.1 RTDS-based HIL testbed through the electrical interface
Electrical interfaces include both analogue and digital I/O cards.
They allow RTDS to establish bi-directional communication
through both analogue and digital signals. A schematic diagram of
the HIL testing platform is shown in Fig. 1. 
The two-area power system and associated current transformers
(CTs) are all modelled in RTDS. The CTs are providing secondary
current measurement signals to external devices through the
analogue electrical I/O interface. As the analogue output signal
from the analogue I/O interface is ±10 V whilst for protection
relays, nominal voltage and current level for the secondary side are
usually 110 V and 1 A, respectively. Therefore, an amplifier is used
as an interface between RTDS and protection relays. The trip and
reclose signals provided by a relay can be sent back to the RTDS
through the digital I/O interface. It can be used to send or receive
binary signals to or from relays. The received signal is then applied
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directly to control the operation of the circuit breaker. The circuit
breaker status from the RTDS can also be sent back to the relay.
By setting up the testing platform, relays are behaving in such a
way as if they were installed and deployed in an actual substation.
The triggering of various faults, tampering and disabling events
in power systems is configured and fully customisable within the
RTDS. All electrical variables within the power system, analogue
input/output signals, and digital input/output signals can be readily
measured in real time. This is useful in terms of the identification
of potential impact to the system from tampered or disables
equipment/signals.
2.2 RTDS-based testbed through IEC-61850 interface
As shown in Fig. 2, the RTDS will be acting as an IEC-61850
compatible IED and communicate with another IEC-61850
compatible IED through IEC-61850 interface card. The RTDS
IEC-61850 interface card is compatible with IEC-61850
communication with sample values (SVs), generic object oriented
substation events (GOOSE) and manufacturing message
specification. A GTNET-SV card will be able to transfer sampled
values for voltage and current signals to the connected IED
whereas a GTNET-GSE card can send and receive status or control
signals to or from the IED. By using the IEC-61850 protocol, only
Ethernet communication is required and hence, from cabling point
of view, a lot of effort can be saved compared with a traditional
electrical cabling setup. 
Apart from the communication between the RTDS and IEDs, a
network environment needs to be established as required by
IEC-61850. In this case, as shown in Fig. 3, the testing network
environment has been setup. All the devices are connected to a
network switch under a router. A global positioning system clock is
used for time synchronisation as the grandmaster with an IP
address of 172.24.31.30. Engineering personal computers are also
connected to the network switch. As an example, the IED to be
tested is an IEC-61850 compatible feeder protection relay. It is
compatible with the IEC-61850 GOOSE messaging protocol.
Together with the RTDS GTNET-GSE card, both devices are under
virtual local area network 100, which is a subgroup for GOOSE
messaging devices to reduce performance impact from the
multicast packet storm. 
2.3 RTDS supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
system
A SCADA system, as shown in Fig. 4, is developed in the RTDS
software RSCAD to enable monitoring and the issuing of process
commands, such as controller set point changes, different settings
of fault conditions, and tampered scenarios. The SCADA system
developed in RSCAD grants users a graphical user interface for a
high-level process supervisory management in real time. The
following information can be obtained from the SCADA
implementation in RSCAD:
• Active and reactive power output from synchronous generators.
• Magnitude and angle of bus voltages.
• Status of the circuit breaker.
• Active and reactive power through transmission lines.
• Normal/overloading condition of transmission lines.
In addition, the supervisory control, data acquisition, and
condition monitoring for various testing scenarios can also be
achieved and customised for specific testing condition settings. 
2.4 Design test cases
When designing test cases, it is very important to identify where
the risks would come from. For general equipment, it would
usually be three types, input, output and internal software or
algorithm.
To analyse an IED device, e.g. protection relay, by looking into
Fig. 5, the potential risk could come from the following different
areas: (i) Analogue inputs: These signals usually carry current or
voltage data. The magnitude or phase could be altered or
completely changed. (ii) Protection functions: The settings of the
protection functions could be tampered. Protection elements could
be exploited. Therefore the IEDs can be in mal-operation or being
completely disabled. (iii) Tripping/closing signals: These signals
are rather important as they have direct control over the circuit
breaker. (iv) Communication between relays: These are usually
digital status or control signals to perform inter-tripping or
interlocking actions. (v) Ethernet communication: Whilst providing
convenience for engineers to manage the IEDs, it potentially also
gives hackers the possibility of remotely accessing the IEDs. When
designing the test cases for IEDs, all these different areas should
have a good coverage so that the IEDs are being tested thoroughly. 
In the meantime, it is also very important to understand and
identify the risk. The risk is a composite of probability and impact.
Whenever a test case has been designed, its probability and impact
should be analysed at the same time. In practice, given the same
time scale and budget, it is worthwhile to focus on those that have
both higher probability and impact.
Fig. 1  Schematic for RTDS based HIL testbed through an electrical
interface
 
Fig. 2  Schematic for RTDS based HIL testbed through the IEC-61850
interface
 
Fig. 3  Network topology for RTDS-based HIL testbed
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Last but not least, when a test case is being designed, it is also
very important to consider what kind of test system it should use.
For a test only focus on single equipment, a simple test system can
be used. As an example, in this study, as shown previously in
Fig. 1, Kundur's two-area four-machine system was used. On the
other hand, when conducting test cases where the cascading effect
is expected, a larger power system should be considered. For
example, an IEEE 39-bus system was implemented in RTDS for
conducting wider area system impact as shown in Fig. 6 [9].
Furthermore, it is also possible to replicate a practical power
system within RTDS if required, as long as the system topology
and parameters are available. 
3 Case studies
Three test scenarios are presented in this section, to conduct cyber
events and evaluate their impacts on the reliability, security, and
safety of network operation for conventional P&C systems. The
first case studies the system behaviour of a disabled tripping signal
during faults. The second case focuses on the effects of tampered
delayed auto reclosure. Both cases are based on the two-area four-
machine system as shown in Fig. 7. The RTDS-based HIL testing
platform is used to simulate these cases. The third case study
investigates susceptibility to replay GOOSE message. 
3.1 Case 1: disabled trip signal at one end
In this case study, a permanent three-phase to ground fault is
applied at the middle (50% length) of the transmission line
(TL78b) between Bus 7 and Bus 8. Two circuit breakers (CBs),
CB1 and CB2, are located at each end of the transmission line. An
attack of the disabled tripping signal of CB2 is simulated.
As shown in Fig. 8, the fault happens at 0.036 s, the trip signal
from the relay is pulled high at 0.057 s. The control signal of the
CB1 changes at 0.067 s and the CB1 is opened at 0.067 s. The trip
signal of the CB2 stays at high as it is disabled. However, the CB2
successfully opens at 0.087 s when receives the direct transfer trip
(DTT) signal from the CB1. 
In a case of the disabled trip signal at one end, tripping can only
be achieved with the DTT signal from the other end. The attack
may trigger malfunction of circuit breakers or disable the
functionality of the circuit breaker. This could cause regional
power loss or lead to wider area system blackout.
3.2 Case 2: tampered delayed auto reclosure
In this case study, fully customisable and configurable external
delayed auto-reclose (DAR) has been modelled in RTDS. A
temporary three-phase to the ground fault of 140 ms is applied on
the transmission line TL78b between bus 7 and bus 8. The circuit
breaker behaviour and power transmissions on TL78a and TL78b
in both normal and tampered cases are compared to evaluate the
impacts of this kind of attack.
In normal status, as shown in Fig. 9, the fault applies at 0.1248 
s. The two circuit breakers, CB1 and CB2, open at 0.1544 s. DAR
initiates at 1.1784 s. The DAR delay time is set to 1 s. 
It can be seen from Fig. 10 that the currents, active and reactive
power of TL78b increases as the fault applies and soon drops to 0
as both CBs opens. On the other hand, the currents and power of
the parallel transmission line TL78a drop as the fault applied and
increases significantly after both CBs open. Both lines are able to
get back to the nominal working state after DAR. 
If the healthy check signal of the CB2 is tampered or disabled,
creating false healthy status, malfunction of DAR may be triggered
or the functionality of DAR may be disabled. In this case, the DAR
function is ‘unhealthy’ at CB2 and the reclosure will not be
achieved at both ends. As shown in Fig. 11, the same temporary
fault is applied and CB1 and CB2 are opened. However, the
expected auto reclosure is not successful and both circuit breakers
stay open. 
Fig. 4  RTDS SCADA system
 
Fig. 5  IEDs and their communication
 
Fig. 6  Schematic of an IEEE 39-bus system
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As shown in Fig. 12, the currents, the active and reactive power
of TL78b drop and stay at 0 as both CBs open. The power
supposed to be a transmission on TL78b is forced to TL78a,
causing the currents, active and reactive power of TL78a increase
significantly, which largely affects the system reliability. This kind
of attack could cause regional power loss or lead to wider area
system blackout. 
3.3 Case 3: susceptibility to replay GOOSE messages
This test case aims to validate the susceptibility to replay GOOSE
messages. In this test case, an IEC-61850 compatible feeder
protection relay is used. It has been set to receive a binary signal
sent from RTDS. The binary signal has then been bounced to
VB001 as a virtual bit in the relay and tied to PB4A_LED, which is
the upper LED of push button 4 on the front panel. In RTDS, a
toggle controller has been used to control the corresponding binary
signal. To test the susceptibility of GOOSE messages, two stages
are designed. In stage one, set the toggle switch to OFF in RTDS
simulation so that RTDS will keep sending the OFF message to the
relay. Wireshark is used to capture the corresponding GOOSE
message packet. The state of the packet is then altered to ON and
the packet is then replayed back to the network.
The relay did not acknowledge the altered packet and the LED
is still showing OFF state. This is possible due to the status number
(StNum), sequence number (SqNum) and time value in the packet
are not updated accordingly so that the relay refuse to change the
status of the corresponding signal.
In stage two, IED Explorer is used to reproducing GOOSE
messages being sent from RTDS. IED Explorer is able to capture
GOOSE messages in the network. The dataset captured can be
automatically analysed and modify. Its GOOSE sender function, as
shown in Fig. 13, can then import such a dataset and replay in the
network. Such a function is considered as forging a genuine
GOOSE message and is expected to be accepted by the subscribed
IEDs. 
Time, StNum and SqNum values are increased accordingly and
synchronised while being transmitted. It appears that the relay
acknowledges such messages and set corresponding front panel
LED to ON state. However, it flips between ON and OFF due to
receiving two different message streams. Potentially, there is a risk
if the attacker managed to attach a device to craft certain packets, it
can tamper or disable the corresponding IED input or output, which
could result in wider area power system failure.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, an RTDS-based HIL testbed was designed,
implemented and adapted as appropriate for the HIL testing of
Fig. 7  Kunder's two-area four-machine system
 
Fig. 8  Disabled trip signal at one end
 
Fig. 9  Normal case
 
Fig. 10  Current and power for the normal case
 
Fig. 11  Disabled health signal for CB2
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P&C equipment/functions of the pre-defined P&C systems. HIL
tests through both standard electrical and emerging IEC- 61850-
based interfaces have been presented. The basic concepts of
designing test cases for IEDs have also been discussed. The
performance of this testing platform has been tested and validated
against tampered or disabled equipment. The developed HIL
testing platform is an effective tool that can be used to conduct
cyber physical studies by simulating different cyber-attacks and
fault events to the power system. The standard power system bench
mark system can be modelled in the HIL testing platform.
Moreover, given realistic system and equipment parameters, the
practical system can also be replicated within the HIL testing
platform, which would be useful for investigating specific
intentional attack for a regional or wider area network in real life.
The HIL testing platform is scalable and can be repeatedly used for
testing P&C system to ensure the stability, reliability and security
of the future smart grid.
5 Acknowledgments
This work is from a Network Innovation Allowance Project in
collaboration with National Grid, UK. This project was sponsored
by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets and the UK EPSRC
under grant no. EP/M002845/1.
6 References
[1] Chakhchoukh, Y., Ishii, H.: ‘Coordinated cyber-attacks on the measurement
function in hybrid state estimation’, IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 2015, 30, pp.
2487–2497
[2] Dae-Hyun, C., Le, X.: ‘Ramp-induced data attacks on look-ahead dispatch in
real-time power markets’, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2013, 4, pp. 1235–1243
[3] Ye, H., Ge, Y., Liu, X., et al.: ‘Transmission line rating attack in two-
settlement electricity markets’, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2016, 7, pp. 1346–
1355
[4] Zhang, H., Cheng, P., Shi, L., et al.: ‘Optimal denial-of-service attack
scheduling with energy constraint’, IEEE Trans. Autom. Control, 2015, 60,
pp. 3023–3028
[5] Chang, R.: ‘Defending against flooding-based distributed denial-of-service
attacks: a tutorial’, IEEE Commun. Mag., 2002, 40, (10), pp 42–51
[6] Mo, R.C.Y., Sinopoli, B.: ‘Detecting integrity attacks on SCADA systems’,
IEEE Trans. Control Syst. Technol., 2014, 22, pp. 1396–1407
[7] Zhang, F., Sun, Y., Cheng, L., et al.: ‘Measurement and modeling of delays in
wide- area closed-loop control systems’, IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 2015, 30,
pp. 2426–2433
[8] Tian, J., Liu, Z., Shu, J., et al.: ‘Base on the ultra-short term power prediction
and feed-forward control of energy management for microgrid system applied
in industrial park’, IET Gener. Transm. Distrib., 2016, 10, pp. 2259–2266
[9] Pai, A.: ‘Energy function analysis for power system stability’ (Springer, New
York, NY, USA, 1989)
Fig. 12  Current and power for the unhealthy case
 
Fig. 13  IED explorer GOOSE sender
 
1134 J. Eng., 2018, Vol. 2018 Iss. 15, pp. 1130-1134
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
